عنوان مقاله [English]
The consensus gentium argument is a commonly cited argument in favor of the existence of God. It draws upon the widespread belief in God as evidence supporting His existence. Although the argument has not received the same level of attention from philosophers as other arguments, it has nevertheless been a subject of ongoing debate, modification, and revision. In recent decades, as new debates in epistemology emerged, Linda Zagzebski, a prominent contemporary epistemologist and philosopher of religion, presented a fresh formulation of the consensus gentium argument. She finds the traditional formulation of the argument, based on inference to the best explanation, to be problematic, as there are viable alternative explanations, such as psychological and sociological factors, that can account for the widespread belief in God. Zagzebski develops her version of the consensus gentium argument for the existence of God by incorporating her insights from the epistemology of trust. Challenging the notion of epistemic authority, she asserts that placing trust in our own cognitive faculties necessitates trusting the cognitive faculties of others as well. Consequently, the presence of widespread belief in God among others serves as prima facie evidence supporting the existence of God. By employing an analytical approach, this article asserts that Zagzebski's formulation overcomes the challenges encountered by previous versions of the argument. While acknowledging its own limitations, it contends that Zagzebski's formulation proves to be more successful than traditional formulations.