نوع مقاله : علمی ـ پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران. تهران، ایران
2 دانشیار مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران، تهران، ایران
3 استادیار مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران. تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The issue of philosophical secondary intelligibles is an essential prelude to a rediscovery of Qāḍī Sa‘īd Qumī’s philosophical system, particularly his rejection of the primacy of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd). With a careful study of those of his work which are attributed to him beyond any doubts and drawing on the descriptive-analytic method, we seek to analyze Qāḍī’s views of philosophical secondary intelligibles and their laws. It turns out that he never uses the term “secondary intelligibles,” instead referring to them as “general things,” in which he includes concepts such as existence, object, possibility, and necessity. He describes these as general, self-evidence concepts, and “infinitive” notions occurring to, and predicated of, all things, taking them to be the weakest things in terms of existence with a trace of existence in the fact itself (nafs al-amr). Some of his statements refer to a kind of metaphysical occurrence of philosophical concepts. In his discussion of generation (ja‘l), however, he takes the “quiddity” to be essentially created and other accidents and implications of a thing as accidentally created. His emphasis on simple generation sheds light on certain confusions. From Qāḍī’s words two distinct levels of externality of philosophical concepts can be derived: first, these concepts have a faint trace of realization and objectivity; and second, they have no realization and objectivity over and above the essence
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
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