نوع مقاله : علمی ـ پژوهشی
نویسنده
عضو هیئت علمی پژوهشگاه علوم و فرهنگ اسلامی.
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
In this paper I seek to provide an internalist account of moral intuitionism by employing Fumerton's and BonJour's model of non-doxastic foundationalism, that is, to account for the justification of moral beliefs in terms of existent entities that are internal to the subject, present to him. In other words, this account takes as basic the existent entities in order to stop the justificatory chain of moral beliefs. Accordingly, states of moral consciousness and moral intuitive knowledge has three aspects and these three states of consciousness are sufficient for determining the foundation of the justificatory chain of moral beliefs: (a) direct consciousness of rightness of some act, such as goodness of justice, (b) direct consciousness of belief concerning rightness thereof, and (c) direct consciousness of the relation between these two states. In order to do this I will first deal with the justification of moral intuition. I will then provide an internalist account of moral intuitionism that is epistemologically based on non-doxastic foundationalism, and I will finally respond to such problems as regress, the unconscious and the layman's knowledge of moral intuitions.
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