عنوان مقاله [English]
In this paper we critically examine the nature of the moral in Nishida Kitarō’s views, by drawing on a descriptive-analytic method, and through a content analysis of some of his works. In Nishida’s view, the moral is grounded in a number of fundamental philosophical proposi-tions. This requires some explanation, to which this research is partly devoted. The main question is what a morally good action is in Nishida’s view? According to Nishida, a morally good action is one that spontane-ously arises from a moderate character. A moral action is characterized as genuine and non-genuine. A morally good action leads one toward uni-ty—unity with being, one’s authentic self, and others. The desire towards the other and unity with it constitutes the core of a moral ‘ought.’ The notions of loyalty, love, and responsibility towards others come from this desire or force. A good genuine action tends to unity and the center, whereas morally bad actions tend toward plurality and escape from the center. The center rests on a metaphysical foundation of the absolute entity. Nishida’s moral philosophy is descriptive in character, lacking any normative dimension in the most specific sense of the term. The pa-per ultimately aims to present foundational and superficial critiques of Nishida’s latter idea. Finally, we criticize and ask questions about the moral in Nishida’s philosophy.