نوع مقاله : علمی ـ پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه معاصر. دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران.
2 دانشیار دانشکده الهیات دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
On the explanation of action, two general approaches can be distinguished: causal and non-causal explanations.
John Searle, while adopting a position that in some respects resembles Davidson’s causal view, goes beyond it by introducing novel elements such as intentional causation and causal self-reference into the discussion. On the other hand, although Searle is partially influenced by the Wittgensteinian non-causal approach, he provides a more comprehensive model of action explanation through a fundamental analysis of acts.
This paper, adopting an analytic-critical approach, examines Searle’s view of the rational explanation of action and, by situating his theory in relation to the aforementioned approaches, explores the main challenges it faces.
The findings indicate that, for Searle, the rational explanation of action rests on two essential components: desire and belief. These components bear a causal relation to action, though not one of necessary causation. Searle classifies desires (or motivational states) into three types—brute facts, intentional states, and institutional facts—each of which, in his view, can serve as a causal factor in the production of action.
Searle’s account of rational action explanation can respond to challenges such as normativity, logical connection, and actions with multiple reasons, yet it remains inadequate in addressing the problem of deviant causal chains and the epistemic access problem.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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