نوع مقاله : علمی ـ پژوهشی
نویسنده
عضو هیأت علمی گروه فلسفه دانشگاه کردستان
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
In the philosophy of German idealist philosophers (except Hegel), explaining reality as it is, seeing the truth in it, and basing philosophy on explaining existing reality are absent. In fact, in the subjective perspective of Kant and Fichte, rationality and explanation of epistemological and ontological logic do not belong to objective reality, but only the subject has a conceptual logic that can create the idea (although in Kant, sense plays the role of a trigger, but does not have an internal logic). Therefore, the objective domain is always placed under the rational forms of the subject. In Schelling, the identity of nature and its recognition in the rational domain are accepted, but the explanation of this rationality in reality is again not debatable by the objective concept, but is left to the philosopher's rational intuition. And the concept is again determined by the rationality of the subject, but with Hegel everything is different, and reality emerges from contempt, and the concept returns to the logic of the matter itself. With Hegel's new definition of the concept, he can also remove the meaning of the idea and the absolute from the abstract state,
کلیدواژهها [English]
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