نوع مقاله : علمی ـ پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانش آموختۀ دکتری دانشگاه تهران پست دکتری از بنیاد علم ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
To elucidate the idea of "mental existence" and understand the concerns of its critics, it is crucial to distinguish between “existence in the mind” and “mental existence.” The former refers to the fact that when a person encounters a new object, something is imprinted in their mind that was previously absent. However, the Sadraen interpretation of the theory of “mental existence” suggests that the quiddity (māhiyya) in the mind corresponds to the quiddity in external reality. This study examines the background of Mullā Ṣadrā’s position on this issue and the critiques leveled against it by Rajab ʿAlī Tabrīzī. Employing a library-based research approach and emphasizing primary sources from renowned philosophers, this study demonstrates that most thinkers preceding Ṣadrā understood the first meaning within the framework of the “phantasm” (shabaḥ) theory. In contrast, the second meaning is unique to Mullā Ṣadrā, with only some antecedents found in the Shiraz school. With his Neo-Peripatetic discourse, Tabrīzī challenges the theory of mental existence in terms of both its foundations and implications. The refutation of Ṣadrā’s premises in formulating this theory can be inferred from Tabrīzī’s ontological discussions, whereas his critique of Ṣadrā’s conclusions is explicitly presented in the works of Tabrīzī and his students. According to their view, the separation of a quiddity’s concomitants—such as the separability of fire from its burning property—is impermissible in any domain, whether external reality or the mind.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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