نوع مقاله : علمی ـ پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشیار، گروه کلام و فقه و حقوق، دانشکده علوم و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه قرآن و حدیث قم، قم، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
he analysis and evaluation of the scope of the Principle of Divine Grace (Qāʿidat al-Luṭf) according to scholars of jurisprudential principles (Uṣūliyyūn) is the main question of this study. Conducted under the presupposition of the necessity of divine grace and adopting a constructive rather than foundational analytical approach, this research critically examines the theories of these scholars—a task deemed necessary due to the paucity of studies in this area. The findings reveal that the approach mandating categorical grace (luṭf tanjīzī) is incompatible with rational judgment, as reason recognizes no condition other than the realization of the subject in affirming the obligation of divine grace. The perspective advocating the absolute obligation of grace is subject to three interpretations, all of which are found to be invalid and unacceptable. A significant flaw in the categorical grace approach lies in the incompleteness of its foundational basis, particularly when the ground of this distinction is an appeal to interpretive inclination (inṣirāf). Furthermore, the perspective that necessitates fulfilling grace (luṭf muḥaṣṣil) conflicts with the definition of preparatory grace (luṭf muqarrib), while the real obligation approach to grace addresses objections on the minor premise of the argument rather than contributing to restrictive approaches to the Principle of Divine Grace. I support the differentiation between types of grace, considering some obligatory and others recommended. However, it requires a proper interpretation that harmonizes with the established methodologies in both Islamic theology and jurisprudential principles (uṣūl al-fiqh).
کلیدواژهها [English]
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