بررسی شرایط یک نظریۀ موفق عمل‌ - نوع

نوع مقاله : علمی ـ پژوهشی

نویسنده

پژوهشگاه دانشهای بنیادی، پژوهشکده فلسفه

چکیده

در نظریه‌های سنتی در باب سرشت گزاره‌ها، گزاره‌ها حامل‌های اولیۀ بازنمایی‌ هستند. یک نظریۀ
عمل‌ - نوع در باب سرشت گزاره‌ها بر آن است که نظریه‌های سنتی نمی‌توانند به نحو رضایت‌بخشی بازنمایی‌ گزاره‌ها را تبیین کنند؛ بنابراین ما باید نظریه‌های سنتی را کنار بگذاریم. مطابق با یک نظریۀ عمل‌ - نوع، وقتی یک عامل یک ویژگی را بر یک شیء حمل می‌کند، آن شیء را به‌مثابۀ چیزی که واجد آن ویژگی است بازنمایی می‌کند. این یعنی آنکه عامل‌ به واسطۀ عمل حملی که انجام می‌دهد حامل اصلی و اولیۀ ویژگی بازنمایی‌‌ است. در این نظریه گزاره‌ها انواعِ نمونه‌های عمل حمل هستند و ویژگی بازنمایی‌ را از این نمونه‌ها به ارث می‌برند. در این مقاله دو تقریر اصلی نظریۀ عمل‌ - نوع معرفی شده است: تقریر سومز و تقریر هنکس. سپس مهم‌ترین نقاط قوت و ضعف هر تقریر بیان می‌شود. با عطف توجه به نقاط ضعف هر تقریر نتیجه گرفته می‌شود که هیچ‌یک از دو تقریر نمی‌تواند به‌عنوان یک نظریۀ موفق عمل‌ - نوع محسوب شود؛ همچنین با عطف توجه به نقاط قوت و ضعف هر تقریر نشان داده می‌شود که یک نظریۀ عمل‌ - ‌نوع برای آنکه یک نظریۀ موفق محسوب شود باید چه شرایطی را برآورده کند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Circumstances of a Successful Act-Type Theory

نویسنده [English]

  • Faraz Ghalbi
School of analytic philosophy, Institute for research in fundamental sciences, Tehran
چکیده [English]

According to traditional theories of the nature of propositions, propositions are primary vehicles of representations. An act-type theory of the nature of propositions holds that traditional theories cannot satisfactorily account for the representational character of propositions. We should therefore set aside the traditional theories. According to an act-type theory, when an agent predicates a property of an object, she represents the object as something that possesses that property. That is, the agent is the primary vehicle of the property of representation in virtue of the act of predication that she does. On this theory, propositions are types of tokens of the act of predication, inheriting the property of representation from those tokens. In this article, I introduce two main versions of the act-type theory: Soames’s and Hanks’s. I will then overview the main weaknesses and strengths of these two versions. Considering the flaws of both versions, I conclude that neither can qualify as a successful act-type theory. Moreover, given the strengths and weaknesses of the two versions, I show the conditions that an act-type theory must fulfil in order to qualify as successful.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • proposition
  • act-type theory
  • Scott Soames
  • Peter Hanks

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