عنوان مقاله [English]
In the traditional jurisprudence, it is said that there is a presumption in favor of the unreliability of conjectures (ẓunūn), and only certain conjec-tures, buttressed with reliable evidence, are reliable or authoritative. Some contemporary intellectuals have challenged the unreliability of rational conjectures, believing that evidence adduced for the above claim in the traditional jurisprudence does not go through. In volumes 92 and 96 of Naqd va Nazar, an article was published by Hossein Kamkar in critique of Abolqasem Fanaei’s claim and in defense of the principle of the unreliability of rational conjectures. The critic tries to establish the principle of the unreliability of rational conjectures (the claim in tradi-tional jurisprudence), responds to Abolqasem Fanaei’s objections, and raises objections against his arguments. In my view, the critic’s attempt to undermine Fanaei’s arguments and defend the traditional jurispru-dence fails, and the principle of reliability of rational conjectures (Fanaei’s claim) is flawless. Drawing on a rational-analytic method, the paper seeks to show the implausibility of the claim by the traditional jurisprudence to the effect that conjectures are unreliable, and indeed the contrary is plausible and reasonable; that is, the idea that the pre-sumption is in favor of the reliability of all conjectures except in cases where there is conclusive evidence for their unreliability. The conclusion I draw from my consideration of the two papers by Hossein Kamkar is that his objections against Fanaei’s claim involve negligence of chains of transmissions and implications of hadiths and of the priority of rational evidence over transmitted evidence. I believe that the religious legisla-tor could not rule out the reliability of rational conjectures, arguments adduced by Muslim jurists and scholars of principles of jurisprudence are not sufficiently cogent, and rational conjectures are like certitudes essen-tially reliable.