عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]چکیده [English]
The main purpose of this paper is to examine Moore's view on the indefinability of good: is good an definable?. In his view, the concept of good is not derivable of any other concept. Therefore "good" is irreducible to other concepts. According to him, goodness is simple and indefinable. What is meant by definition? Among different definitions Moore focuses on the most important sense of it. In addition Moore considers the “good ", as a non- natural quality. He thinks that any effort to equal the good with other natural qualities as a fallacy and names it naturalistic fallacy and he supports his idea by open question argument. In this paper we will argue that Moore's argument shows at most that the meaning of good and pleasure, for example, are not the same. They are conceptually different but it does not prevent us to suppose that they both indicate to one and same property.