عنوان مقاله [English]
This paper investigate the role of higher-order evidence in the debates concerning epistemology of disagreement. After giving definitions for first-order and higher-order evidence respectively and emphasizing the difference between them, I propose an Argument for the view that higher-order evidence could be considered as evidence just in absence of first-order evidence. Then through assessing the example concerning reasoning-distorting drug, I investigate and criticize one of the most important views in epistemology of disagreement, namely David Christensen's view. In this part I defend the similarity between the role of higher-order evidence and undercutter evidence and the sameness of their functions in epistemology of disagreement. Finally, I propose and assess Thomas Kelly's argument for the neutral role of higher-order evidence in the debate. In this part,after defending Kelly's argument from an objection that says considering the probative force of higher-order evidence leads to Equal Weight View , I'll show how the Kelly's argument claims to work.