عنوان مقاله [English]
The issue of the language of religion that was introduced in reaction to positivism is very significant in the philosophy of religion. One approach to the semantics of such a language is non-cognitivism according to which religious propositions do not describe any facts. D. Z. Phillips is a well-known proponent of non-cognitivism. He distinguished different aspects of the human nature, taking each to be conceived in its own context. Thus the task of the philosophy of religion is not to prove religious propositions; rather it should clarify religious concepts. He maintains that it is a mistake to talk about the fact of there being a God; he thinks that God is just a mental construct. The main problem with this non-cognitivist view is its inconsistency, since one cannot be a non-cognitivist and be a religious believer at the same time. For one cannot relate to God as an unreal mental construct. There is also a sociological worry about the view: if there is no inclusive realm, then it would be impossible to understand other cultures and religions, and thus it would not be possible to provide an alternative to religions. Moreover, Phillips's analysis of religious propositions is Procrustean and it fails to explain the conceptions had by believers of religious propositions. Though he has tried to rescue religious propositions from positivist criteria, he finally falls in the positivist trap.