عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]چکیده [English]
Denying causal necessity is one of the topics over which an Ashari-minded like al-Ghazaali takes issue with philosophers. In the seventeenth problem of Tahafut al-Falasifa (Incoherence of Philosophers), he relies on two implausible implications of causal necessity (denial of both miracles and the absolute power of God) to attack the conception of causation as understood by philosophers from various aspects. In Tahfut at Tahafut (Incoherence of the Incoherence), Ibn Rush, as an Aristotelian and Muslim philosopher, encounters al-Ghazali’s challenges. In this paper, after an exact disposition and analysis of al-Ghazali’s view and Ibn Rushd’s replies, it will be tried to explain their pre-suppositions and consequences as well as their success or failure regarding their contentions.