وظیفه‌گروی اخلاقیِ‎ ‎مبتنی بر حسن و قبح عقلی و ‏سازگار با فضیلت‌گروی و غایت‌گروی

Statement of the Problem:

The central problem of this paper is to investigate the possibility and mechanism of formulating a deontological (duty-based) ethical theory that simultaneously aligns with the theological doctrine of "rational goodness and badness"  within the Imami Shia tradition, while remaining fully compatible with teleology and virtue ethics. The foundational question is whether a rational basis for moral obligations can be established that is robust yet avoids the unacceptable implications of Kantian deontology, such as the total negation of goal-oriented actions and a disregard for virtues. Can the theory of rational goodness and badness—which underscores the intellect's intrinsic perception of the rightness and wrongness of actions in Imami theology—be structured into a normative ethical theory that prioritizes reason while systematically accommodating teleological goals and virtues? The primary objective of this research is to formulate and defend a model of "moderate deontology" grounded in rational goodness and badness that coordinates with the theological foundations of the Adliyyah (Justice-oriented schools) and remedies the recognized deficiencies of its two main rivals: teleology and virtue ethics.
In the course of this investigation, it becomes clear that teleological theories alone, without reliance on deontological principles, are incapable of justifying "moral obligation." To determine an "ultimate end," teleology is forced to invoke a rational perception of "oughts," which is inherently deontological in character. Similarly, virtue ethics cannot validate the authority of moral values without assuming a deontological foundation (such as the judgment of reason regarding the necessity of acquiring virtue); when it appeals to practical reason , it effectively reduces to a form of deontology. Operating with a realistic and epistemological approach based on the a priori perception of reason, the theory of rational goodness and badness can function as a powerful deontological framework within the philosophy of ethics across four distinct dimensions: semantics, ontology, epistemology, and the plane of normative authority .

Research Methodology:

The present study utilizes a "rational and analytical" methodology. Relying on philosophical analysis, the authors first unpack core concepts such as "duty," "end/goal," "virtue," "rational goodness and badness," "moral necessity," and "obligation," followed by a critical assessment of the rival ethical systems. In the first section, using a method of internal critique, the paper demonstrates that teleology must ultimately refer to "reason" and rational "oughts" to justify its ultimate ends, and virtue ethics similarly requires an independent judgment of reason to justify the "golden mean" or "virtuous models." In the second section, utilizing a descriptive-analytical approach, the theory of rational goodness and badness is elucidated across four axes: semantics (defining good and bad as "moral necessity" and the "worthiness of performance or omission"), ontology (the objective and intrinsic nature of goodness and badness independent of human desires, purposes, or divine command), epistemology (the capacity of practical reason for the immediate, self-evident, and a priori perception of these values), and validation/authority (the internal self-evidence of reason and the absurd consequences of denying rational goodness and badness). In the third section, a synthetic method is deployed to present the final formulation of "moderate deontology," wherein the priority of reason is maintained while the status of ends and virtues is systematically defined within the framework of rational duties.

Research Results:

The findings obtained from this study are structured as follows:
First: The critical evaluation of rival theories reveals that teleology—across all its iterations from hedonism to perfectionism—confronts a structural challenge regarding the "criterion of preference" for determining its ultimate end. If a teleologist asserts that "reason perceives that one ought to pursue a specific end," they have effectively departed from the boundaries of teleology and embraced deontology, because the criterion of morality is no longer the "consequence" itself, but the "rational perception of the ought." Likewise, virtue ethics must appeal to reason to justify the goodness of the golden mean or the virtuous archetype; if it claims that "reason decrees that virtue is good," the ultimate arbiter becomes a "rational duty" rather than virtue itself. Therefore, without a deontological anchor, neither rival theory can successfully justify moral obligations.
Second: In elaborating the theory of rational goodness and badness as a deontological model:

Semantically, goodness and badness are defined as "moral necessity" and the "worthiness of performance or omission."
Ontologically, goodness and badness are real and intrinsic properties—neither socially constructed nor dependent upon divine command—which reason perceives independently of consequences and external goals.
Epistemologically, practical reason possesses the capacity for the a priori and self-evident perception of these values (such as the inherent rightness of justice and the wrongness of oppression) without requiring revelation or empirical validation.
With respect to authority, the internal self-evidence of rational judgments and the logical absurdities that follow the denial of rational goodness and badness provide sufficient grounds for validating this theory.

Third: The formulation of the preferred model exhibits the following distinctive features:

Reason independently and on an a priori basis perceives the primary moral "dos and don'ts."
Contrary to Kantian ethics, orienting actions toward specific ends (such as perfection or proximity to God) is entirely permissible, provided that those ends ultimately resolve into a rational duty.
Virtues derive their structural meaning either as direct rational duties or as psychological traits endorsed by reason to facilitate the execution of duty.
Through a critical appraisal of Kantian deontology, this framework successfully establishes a harmonious convergence among all three major ethical theories.

The results demonstrate that God has created the universe such that the fulfillment of rational duties naturally culminates in the actualization of virtues. Furthermore, using the principle of "necessity relative to an end", goal-oriented actions can be systematically organized in alignment with rational duties. Consequently, a moderate deontology grounded in rational goodness and badness preserves complete harmony with the theological foundations of the Adliyyah, possesses the robust capacity to validate and justify the other two ethical models, and successfully moves past the reductionist exclusivism of its rival schools.