Inconsistent Beliefs and Electrophysiological Skin Responses: A Case Study of Gur and Sackeim

The possibility and nature of self-deception have been significant topics in the fields of moral philosophy and psychology. The main approaches to self-deception can be broadly categorized into two groups: intentionalism and motivationalism. The most important distinguishing feature between them is the condition of intentionally holding contradictory beliefs during the process of self-deception. Gur and Sackeim sought to investigate the four conditions of self-deception in individuals by designing a series of experiments and to demonstrate how two contradictory beliefs can coexist in different cognitive domains of a person. In the first experiment, participants made errors in their self-reported identification of sounds, while the electrophysiological skin response (GSR) electrodes indicated correct identification in the subconscious, thus suggesting the presence of contradictory beliefs within the individual. The data from this experiment showed that the errors were motivational, stemming from individuals' previous experiences and self-concepts. The second experiment demonstrated that experiences of success or failure—which alter an individual's level of self-worth—directly influence their ability to identify their own voice. In situations where individuals had experienced failure and consequently felt fear or avoidance of confronting themselves, it was more difficult for them to recognize their own voice. This was accompanied by delays and negative errors in their responses. In contrast, individuals who had experienced success and generally had higher self-worth and self-esteem were less sensitive to self-confrontation and might mistakenly interpret others' voices as their own, which could be seen as a form of self-projection. According to Gur and Sackeim, these two experiments provide empirical evidence for the self-deception hypothesis and illustrate the influence of emotions and motivations—especially one's state of self-worth—on cognitive choices such as identifying and making errors in identifying one's own voice and others'. However, as we will
see, the experiments and their presented results face numerous methodological, interpretive, and conceptual flaws, and ultimately fail to provide a coherent picture of the conditions of ethical self-deception.