An Examination of Functionalism as the Foundation for Computational Models of Free Will in Artificial Intelligence from the Perspective of Transcendent Philosophy (Hikmat-i Muta'aliyah)

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Authors

1 Ph.D. in Islamic Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy and Ethics, Bāqir al-`Ulūm University, Qom, Iran ‎‎(Corresponding Author). ‎

2 Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Fārābī Campus, University ‎of Tehran, Qom, Iran‎.

Abstract

The computational approach to the mind and mental properties, with various formulations including Machine Functionalism, has provided a suitable ground for proposing computational models of free will and decision-making in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). This approach has achieved relative successes along this path; however, the question remains: what are the deficiencies and challenges faced by the computational model regarding human will and its philosophical foundations when confronted with deeper philosophical perspectives such as Transcendent Philosophy (Hikmat-i Muta'aliyah)? This research, using a descriptive-analytical method, examines the computational models proposed for free will in AI (focusing on the Symbolic Approach). Initially, Machine Functionalism is analyzed as the philosophical basis for this approach. Then, relying on the principles and foundations of Sadrā's Transcendent Philosophy, a comprehensive and critical explanation of these models is presented, answering the research's central question. The findings indicate that computational models lack the necessary ontological capacity to explain the truth of the will. This understanding neglects fundamental components such as consciousness (being conscious), phenomenal experience, and intentionality (التفاتی/iltifātī status), which play a central role in Sadrā's explanation of the will. The philosophical examination of this type of issue in the field of AI, apart from its philosophical effects and consequences, directly influences policy-making and legislation in this area, particularly concerning moral and legal responsibility. 

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References

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