A Brief Critique of Cartesian Introspectivism with a focus on the Transparency Thesis

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Authors

1 . PhD student, Department of Contemporary Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Foreign Languages, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran (corresponding author).

2 Assistant professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Foreign Languages, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.

3 . Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Foreign Languages, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.

Abstract

Introspection is a method used to access the contents of the mind, relying on the thesis of the transparency of the mind. This notion constitutes part of Descartes’s philosophical paradigm regarding the mind, characterized by immediacy, infallibility, and first-person authority. Proponents of the transparency thesis argue that the mind resembles a transparent container, with all its contents, including constant entities like mental states and unstable ones like mental events, essentially known. However, empirical experiments and philosophical arguments reveal numerous apparent and hidden intermediaries in the mind, leading to errors in self-understanding, unawareness of external influences, and the presumption of authority over all judgments. This challenges Descartes’s claim that the mind is transparent to itself. Utilizing the analytic-critical method, this article scrutinizes these characteristics to assess the transparency thesis and dispel its self-evidence.

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Main Subjects

References

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