Moral responsibility tracing in self-deception process

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

Assistant professor, Department of Islamic Teachings, Faculty of Humanities, Ahar Islamic Azad University, Ahar, Iran

Abstract

In order to attribute moral responsibility to an agent for a particular action, several conditions must be present. These conditions include knowledge, awareness, intention, ability, and ultimately, the presence of free will. Nevertheless, there are instances where even if an agent initially appears to lack certain conditions, we still attribute responsibility to them for the resulting action. This is because we can trace the conditions of moral responsibility back in time to verify their fulfillment in the past. By employing an analytical approach, This article aims to explore moral responsibility in the context of different forms of moral self-deception. I contend that in cases of moral self-deception, when an agent deliberately chooses to ignore their prior inclinations and allows their motivational bias to influence their desired beliefs, the element of intention can be discerned in their self-deceptive actions. As a result, the agent can be held morally responsible.

Keywords

Main Subjects


* The Holy Quran.
1.    Adams, R. M. (1994). Involuntary sins. The Philosophical Review, 85.
2.    Alizadeh, B. (1400 AP). Revisionism about moral responsibility. Metaphysics 13(31), pp. 19-35. [In Persian]
3.    Alizadeh, M.; Teimuri Fereyduni, A. A. (1396 AP). Self-deception from a psychological and ethical perspective with a focus on Ayatollah Javadi Amoli’s thought. Akhlaq wahyani 7(12), pp. 29-50. [In Persian]
4.    Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Oxford: Blackwell.
5.    Benchimol, J. (2011). The moral significance of unintentional omission: Comparing will-centered and non-will-centered accounts of moral responsibility. In Moral responsibility: Beyond free will and determinism (pp. 101-120). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
6.    Danesh, J. (1396 AP). The ontological realm of the moral agent’s responsibility. Maʿrifat, 26(239), pp. 87-95. [In Persian]
7.    Danesh, J. & Alipour, E. (1397 AP). A consideration of the direct argument for negation of moral responsibility. Naqd va nazar 23(89), pp. 57-74. [In Persian]
8.    Davidson, D. (1982). Paradoxes of Irrationality. In R. Wollheim and J. Hopkins (Eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud. New York: Cambridge University Press.
9.    Davidson, D. (1986). Deception and Division. In J. Elster (Ed.), The Multiple Self. New York: Cambridge University Press.
10.    Eslami, M. T. (1390 AP). Islamic ethics and application of the rule of leniency [tasāmuḥ] concerning evidence for recommended actions (a critical study). Qom: Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy. [In Persian]
11.    Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
12.    Gergen, K. (1985). The Ethnopsychology of Self-Deception. In M. Martin, ed., Self-Deception and Self-Understanding (pp. 228-243). Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
13.    Haight, M. (1980). A Study of Self-Deception. Sussex: Harvester Press.
14.    Kalayi, M. (1394 AP). Self-deception in Western philosophy and ethical writings of Muslims. Qom: Taha. [In Persian]
15.    Kipp, D. (1980). On self-deception. The Philosophical Quarterly, 30(121), pp. 305-317.
16.    Lazar, A. (1999). Deceiving oneself or self-deceived? On the formation of beliefs' under the influence'. Mind, 108(430), pp. 265-290.
17.    Majlisī, Muḥammad Bāqir. (1403 AH). Biḥār al-anwār. Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyya. (Vol. 19). [In Arabic] 
18.    Mele, A. (2001). Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
19.    Quattrone, G. A., & Tversky, A. (1984). Causal versus diagnostic contingencies: On self-deception and on the voter's illusion. Journal of personality and social psychology, 46(2), p. 237.
20.    Trope, Y. & Liberman A. (1996). Social hypothesis testing: cognitive and motivational mechanisms. In E. Higgins and A. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles (pp. 239-270). New York: Guildford Press.
21.    Vargas, M. (2005). The trouble with tracing. Midwest studies in philosophy, 29.
22.    Zimmerman M. J. (2001). Responsibility. In L. C. Becker and C. B. Becker.