In this paper, I will formulate and examine a well-known argument in favor of externalist representationalism: argument from transparency or diaphanousness. This argument seeks to demonstrate that the qualities of consciousness are not, in fact, subjective qualities of the conscious experience. Rather they are qualities of external things and states of affairs which are transparently represented in our consciousness. In this paper, I shall explain and formulate the argument and objections raised against it. In the second section of the paper, I will show, through a phenomenological analysis of transparency and a manipulation of a thought experiment, that transparency can be an argument for representationalism, but not for an externalist version of it.
پوراسماعیل، یاسر، (1386) «آگاهی و مسئلۀ شکاف تبیینی»، فصلنامه فلسفه (دانشگاه تهران) سال 35، شماره 2 : 15-44.
ـــــــــــ ، (1388) «نظریات مرتبه بالاتر دربارۀ آگاهی»، فصلنامه ذهن 38 (پژوهشگاه فرهنگ و اندیشه اسلامی)، سال دهم، تابستان 1388، ص 125-156.
Block, Ned., ( 1990)"Inverted Earth." Edited by J. Tomberlin. Philosophical Perspectives (Ridgeview) 4: 1990: 52-79.
ـــــــــ , (2000) "Mental Paint." In Essays in Honor of Tyler Burge, by M. Hahn and B. Ramberg. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Chalmers, David., (2004)"The Representational Character of Experience." In The Future for Philosophy, by B. Leiter. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Churchland, Paul M., (1981) "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes." The Journal of Philosophy LXXVIII, pp. 67-90.
Dennett, Daniel., (1988) "Quining Qualia." In Consciousness in Modern Science, by A. Marcel and E. Bisiach. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dretske, Fred., (1995) Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA:: The MIT Press.
ـــــــــ, (1999) "The Mind’s Awareness of Itself." In Perception, Belief, and Knowledge, by F. Dretske. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Masrour, Farid., (2010) "Phenomenal Objectivity and Phenomenal Intentionality: in Defense of a Kantian Account." In The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program, by T. Horgan and U. Kriegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rey, Georges., (1983) A Reason for Doubting the Existence of Consciousness. Vol. 3, in Consciousness and Self-Regulation, by R. Davidson, G. Schwartz and D. Shapiro, 1-39. New York: Plenum.
Siegel, Susanna, (2006) "Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience." Philosophical Review 115, no. 3.
Stoljar, Daniel, (2004)"The Argument From Diaphanousness." In Language, Mind and World: Special Issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, by M. Escurdia, Robert J. Stainton and D. V. Christopher. University of Alberta Press.
Tye, Michael, (2000) Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
ـــــــــ, (1995) Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
ـــــــــ, (2002) "Representationalism and the Transparency of Consciousness." Noûs 36 (1), pp. 137-151.
)