Facts and problems concerning the theories of perception

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

PhD Student of Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM)

Abstract

Perception is one of the most important types of mental states in that it plays an essential role in the formation of many of our ordinary and basic beliefs and hence our knowledge of the world, and perhaps more fundamentally, in the formation of many of our concepts. In this paper, I will elaborate the facts that any theory of perceptual experience should accommodate, such as transparency, illusion, and hallucination, as well as the problems that such theories should address, such as the metaphysical and epistemological problems. However, it seems that theories of perceptual experience have overlooked some of these facts and problems and limited themselves only to some of these. In this paper, I seek to show that this is because there is a tension within the facts and problems concerning perceptual experiences and this leads different theories to give priority to the explanation of a certain set of such facts and problems.

Keywords

References

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Naqd Va Nazar
Volume 21, Issue 82
November 2016
Pages 62-94

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