Validity Of Moral Intuitions: A Study Of Singer’s View

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Authors

1 MA Student, Zanjan University.

2 Associate Professor, Zanjan University.

Abstract

Intuitions have a justifying role in ethics, and moral judgments are formed in accordance with them. Scientific studies in cognitive sciences challenged the validity of moral intuitions and strengthened the position of singer that reliance on intuitions cannot be plausible. Singer found three problems with practical intuitions and merely accepted the theoretical intuitions. He believes that relying on pure reason is the only element for preventing us from skepticism, and while he criticized Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, he suggests that any methodological or epistemological theory, like reflective equilibrium that pays a role in intuitions, is fundamentally problematic, and may be an obstacle for moral reformation. In this essay, we introduce Singer's position about validity of intuitions and evaluate it, and then study critics' arguments and show its weak points and strengths.

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References

 

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