Normativity of Meaning in Kripke's Skeptical Argument

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

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Abstract

In this paper, I will first introduce Kripke's skeptical argument, explicating the condition of the normativity of meaning. Kripke takes the normativity condition to be essential for any theory of meaning. I will go on to distinguish weak and strong notions of normativity, showing that Kripke's argument is ambiguous in this respect. I will then discuss McGinn's and Boghossian's interpretations of Kripke's view about normativity. According to McGinn's interpretation, normativity is an inter-temporal notion, and this gives rise to an objection to Kripke's generalization of his skepticism from linguistic content to mental content. Boghossian criticizes McGinn's interpretation, objecting to his criticism of Kripke's argument. I will make another objection to McGinn's view, showing that Boghossian has provided a more precise reading of normativity and skeptical argument.

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References

1. Blackburn, S. (1984) “The Individual Strike Back,” Synthese, no. 58.
2. Boghossian, P. (1989), “The Rule-Following Considerations,” Mind, no. 98.
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9. Wright, C. (1984), “Kripke's Account of the Argument Against Private Language,”The Journal of Philosophy, no. 81.
 

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