The Problem of Evils and the Limitations of Human Knowledge

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

. Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

The primary challenge in addressing the problem of evils is the limitation of human knowledge in comprehending its intricate dimensions. This challenge arises from the significant role that God is perceived to play in either causing or permitting certain evils. While human beings lack the epistemic capacity to fully grasp God''''s purposes and the manner of divine intervention, God is understood as omnipotent and omniscient. Consequently, the limitations of human knowledge prevent a precise and comprehensive understanding of the complex dimensions of the evils we encounter in life. Some scholars have referred to this perspective as skeptical theism. Advocates of this approach seek to counter atheistic arguments that reject God''''s existence on the grounds of the apparent absence of rational justifications for evils—particularly gratuitous evils. They argue that our epistemic limitations in discerning God’s reasons for allowing certain evils do not imply that such reasons do not exist. This study employs content analysis to demonstrate that, while emphasizing our epistemic limitations in understanding the problem of evil is somewhat effective in challenging atheistic arguments, excessive reliance on epistemic skepticism regarding divine intervention leads to a broader form of epistemic skepticism. As a solution, this paper proposes recognizing the diverse epistemic capacities of human beings, emphasizing the significance of a God endowed with absolute attributes, and utilizing these attributes to engage with the problem of evils.

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References

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