The Concept of Deontologism in Plantinga’s Epistemology

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

PhD, Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Sciences, Payam-e Noor University, ‎Center for Graduate Studies, Tehran, Iran.‎

Abstract

The main question of this article is Plantinga’s claim to have resolved the problem of traditional epistemology, analyzed through a descriptive-analytical approach. The aim is to demonstrate the inaccuracy of Plantinga’s claim regarding the concept of deontologism in epistemology. In his epistemology, Plantinga attempts to resolve the challenges of contemporary epistemology by eliminating the components of duty and internalism. He traces his analysis of justification and internalism back to the deontological theories of Descartes and Locke, who defined the justification of beliefs in terms of duty and obligation. Although Plantinga criticizes internalist epistemology and the element of duty, his critique of deontologism does not amount to a denial of epistemic obligation. Rather, he rejects the confinement of epistemic duty to the framework of evidentialism. In fact, the core of his warrant theory remains compatible with a different form of deontologism. Moreover, his view that belief does not require evidence or argument is framed within a normative interpretation of justification. His foundational beliefs emerge from a deontological understanding of justification. However, Plantinga does not specify criteria for the content of basic beliefs; instead, he defines their foundational status in terms of not violating epistemic duties. Thus, he remains bound to the fulfillment of epistemic obligations. The implications of this perspective include the possibility that his position could lead back to internalism—ironically, the very problem that Plantinga sought to overcome ultimately confronts him in his own theory.

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References

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