An Examination of the Moral Supervenience Argument Based ‎on the Concept of Construction from Wielenberg’s Perspective

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

‎. PhD, Department of Moral Philosophy, Faculty of Theology and ‎Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.‎

Abstract

One of the key concepts introduced into the domain of moral ontology, expanding the notions of realism and anti-realism, is the concept of supervenience. In this framework, moral properties are predicated on non-moral properties, incorporating the nature of value into the natural domain to provide an argument for moral naturalists. At the same time, non-naturalists can also employ it to support a form of non-naturalistic realism. This study, using a descriptive-analytical approach, aims to further develop the supervenience argument and apply it in favor of moral naturalism, addressing one of its most significant implications—defending realism and critiquing Mackie’s anti-realist stance. Numerous interpretations of supervenience have been proposed, encompassing necessity, reduction, and dependence. However, Wielenberg, drawing on the concept of construction, offers a distinctive account of supervenience to counter anti-realist objections, including those posed by Mackie. According to Mackie, the attribution or predication of moral properties to natural properties is metaphysically peculiar. Wielenberg’s response posits that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties in a structured construction relation rather than a causal one. This relation, while not causal in the traditional sense, follows a form of consciousness-based causality.

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References

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