A Critical Examination of John Martin Fischer’s Solution to the Problem of Luck

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Authors

1 . MA student, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

2 PhD Graduated in Islamic philosophy and theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

The primary focus of this research is to analyze and critique John Martin Fischer’s proposed solution to the problem of luck. Using a descriptive-analytic method, the study aims to highlight its shortcomings. The problem of luck arises from the belief that the absence of determinism in the formation of actions undermines the agent’s freedom and moral responsibility. Fischer addresses this issue by reimagining one of Frankfurt’s examples in an indeterminate world, presenting two scenarios: one where the world is determined (world 1) and another where it is indeterminate due to a random machine (world 2). According to Frankfurt's examples, the agent in the first possible world bears responsibility. However, in world 2, if the machine happens to be randomly inactive, both worlds become identical, and the agent is deemed responsible. This research demonstrates that (a) Fischer’s framing of the problem of luck aligns with the formulation based on the absence of causation, but his response falls short in addressing this formulation effectively, (b) the causation governing Fischer’s world 2 differs from the indeterministic causation proposed by libertarians advocating for event-based causation. According to them, actively incorporating indeterministic causation into the causal chain of an action is crucial in addressing the problem of luck. However, in Fischer’s world 2, there is no active indeterministic causation involved in the causal chain of action. Therefore, Fischer fails to confront the problem of luck posed to event-based causation, let alone resolving it.

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References

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