Naturalism and Its Self-Defeats

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Authors

1 Associate professor, Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran

2 PhD student, Contemporary Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, College of Literature and Humanities, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran.

Abstract

The notion of naturalism's self-defeat has a long historical lineage. In more recent times, two prominent formulations of the self-defeat objection against naturalism have emerged: the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument. These arguments aim to address two fundamental tenets of naturalism. The argument from reason challenges the idea that mental states are solely causally related, while the evolutionary argument questions the inherent reliability and trustworthiness of cognitive faculties. Both the evolutionary argument and the argument from reason account for the self-defeating aspects of naturalism, accurately pinpointing its inherent flaws: (1) A simplistic justification of mental phenomena within a materialistic context is not the most comprehensive or exclusive rational justification available; (2) according to the theory of natural selection, naturalism prioritizes survival and reproduction over the pursuit of true beliefs; (3) the assertion that cognitive faculties are products of chance undermines the reliability and trustworthiness of these faculties; (4) rather than pursuing epistemic persuasion through its explanatory power, methodological naturalism has transformed into an epistemic presupposition. While these arguments possess strengths in challenging naturalism, it is important to acknowledge their inherent limitations as well. We argue that these flaws are specific to the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument, and therefore, they do not absolve naturalism from other self-defeating objections. Utilizing the analytical-critical methodology, this article aims to accomplish two objectives: firstly, to conduct a comparative study of the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument in elucidating the self-defeating nature of naturalism, and secondly, to articulate the strengths and weaknesses of these two arguments through supplementation and criticism.

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References

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