A Study of Linda Zagzebski’s Formulation of the Consensus Gentium Argument for God’s Existence

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Authors

1 MA, Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 Faculty member, University of Tehran, Farabi Campus, College of Theology, Department of Philosophy. Tehran, Iran

Abstract

The consensus gentium argument is a commonly cited argument in favor of the existence of God. It draws upon the widespread belief in God as evidence supporting His existence. Although the argument has not received the same level of attention from philosophers as other arguments, it has nevertheless been a subject of ongoing debate, modification, and revision. In recent decades, as new debates in epistemology emerged, Linda Zagzebski, a prominent contemporary epistemologist and philosopher of religion, presented a fresh formulation of the consensus gentium argument. She finds the traditional formulation of the argument, based on inference to the best explanation, to be problematic, as there are viable alternative explanations, such as psychological and sociological factors, that can account for the widespread belief in God. Zagzebski develops her version of the consensus gentium argument for the existence of God by incorporating her insights from the epistemology of trust. Challenging the notion of epistemic authority, she asserts that placing trust in our own cognitive faculties necessitates trusting the cognitive faculties of others as well. Consequently, the presence of widespread belief in God among others serves as prima facie evidence supporting the existence of God. By employing an analytical approach, this article asserts that Zagzebski's formulation overcomes the challenges encountered by previous versions of the argument. While acknowledging its own limitations, it contends that Zagzebski's formulation proves to be more successful than traditional formulations.

Keywords

Main Subjects

References

1.    Anderson, C. (2014). Epistemic authority and conscientious belief. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(4), pp. 91-99.
2.    Aristotle. (2005). Metaphysics. NuVision Publications, LLC.
3.    Aronson, E. (1995). The Social Animal. New York. H. Freeman.
4.    Baier, A. (1995). Trust and Anti-Trust. Moral Prejudices: Essays on ethics. Harvard University Press.
5.    Edwards, P. (2006). Common consent arguments for the existence of god. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2nd edition. vol. 2. Edited by Borchert, D. M.
6.    Fricker, E. (2006). Testimony and epistemic autonomy. The epistemology of testimony, pp. 225-250.
7.    Hume, D. (1999). An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Tom L. Beauchamp, Ed. Oxford Philosophical Texts. 
8.    Mohammad-Rezaei, M. (1388 AP). A study of the consensus gentium argument and its comparison with the argument from innate nature. Journal of Philosophical Theological Researches, 10(4), pp. pp. 109-125. [In Persian]
9.    Pritchard, D. & Ryan, S. (2014). Zagzebski on Rationality. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(4), pp. 39-46.
10.    Ramin, F. & Seifalipour, M. (1397 AP). General consensus or innate nature. New religious thought, 14(55), pp. 73-90. [In Persian]
11.    Rollins, J. (2015). Beliefs and testimony as social evidence: Epistemic egoism, epistemic universalism, and common consent arguments. Philosophy Compass, 10(1), pp. 78-90.
12.    Zagzebski, L. T. (2007). Ethical and epistemic egoism and the ideal of autonomy. Episteme: a journal of social epistemology, 4(3), pp. 252-263.
13.    Zagzebski, L. T. (2009). On epistemology. Wadsworth Cengage learning.
14.    Zagzebski, L. T. (2011). Epistemic self-trust and the Consensus Gentium argument. Evidence and religious belief (pp. 22-36). Oxford University Press.
15.    Zagzebski, L. T. (2012). Epistemic authority: A theory of trust, authority, and autonomy in belief. Oxford University Press.
16.    Zagzebski, L. T. (2013). Self-trust and the natural desire for truth. Letter from the Editors, 209.
17.    Zagzebski, L. T. (2014). Epistemic authority and its critics. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(4), pp. 169-187.
18.    Zahavi, D. & Gallagher, S. (2005). Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. 207-222.

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics