A Response to Gertler’s Problem about the Criterion of Internalism-Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

PhD of Philosophy of Mind, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies, Iran, Tehran

Abstract

An important false presupposition in Gertler’s account is that since she thinks of Descartes’s theory, or at least Cartesianism, as an internalist theory as usually construed, our desired criterion for a property that is “intrinsic to the subject” should be devised in such a way that it counts Descartes’s theory or at least Cartesianism as an internalist view. I have doubts both about the accuracy of such a thought and about the putative requirement. The false presupposition led Gertler to fail to provide a general criterion in her first four proposed criteria because she restricts intrinsic properties to properties with particular spatial locations or a particular physical nature. Moreover, other lines of Gertler’s argument also seem problematic. In the final section, I propose and defend a new recursive criterion for the distinction between internalism and externalism. Even if the criterion is not accepted, Gertler’s problem will be resolved because of her false presupposition concerning the requirement of a criterion with an agreed-upon normative-descriptive definition as well as a variety of her methodological mistakes.

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References

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