Imaginability and the Justification of Modal beliefs: a Defense of Yablo’s Model

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

Researcher/ School of philosophy,Institute for research in fundamental sciences, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

A well-known idea in modal epistemology is that conceivability of a proposition is a good guide for its possibility. Yablo analyzes the conceivability as a guide for possibility in terms of imaginability. In his paper, “Conceivability, Imagination, and Modal Knowledge,” Fiocco argues against appealing to imagination-based conceivability in modal epistemology. Fiocco’s first objection is levelled against Yablo’s view that one can make a mistake about exactly which world she has brought into her mind. Fiocco argues that this view should be rejected since it leads to implausible consequences. Furthermore, in his argument against appealing to imagination in modal epistemology, Fiocco draws upon the legitimacy of stipulation in modal issues. For him, it is permissible to stipulate in one’s imagination—when one is asked to bring a possible world to her mind, she can stipulate the world she wants to consider. From this, Fiocco concludes that any understandable proposition will be conceivable; therefore, imagination-based conceivability cannot be a guide for possibility. In this paper, I will defend Yablo’s model against Fiocco’s objections, showing that none of these objections goes through.

Keywords

References

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Naqd Va Nazar
Volume 23, Issue 90 - Serial Number 90
September 2018
Pages 151-175

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