A Defense of Voluntarism against Rival Views

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

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Abstract

Voluntarism seeks to distinguish volitional actions from the non-volitional ones. On this view, volition is a mental action related to beliefs and desires; and it is actualized, it cause an event or a chain of events in the world. The view is in contrast with views of philosophers such as Anscombe, Davidson, and Hornsby. In this paper, I will first introduce the rival views, and their differences. I will then go on to E. J. Lowe's voluntarism, showing that it can handle the problems rival views face. In the end, I will reply to some objections.

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References

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Naqd Va Nazar
Volume 18, Issue 72 - Serial Number 72
November 2013
Pages 97-120

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