The Source of Moral Obligations in the View of ChristineKorsgaard

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

Associate Professor, Zanjan University

Abstract

One of the most important metaethical issues is the source of moral obligations. The problem is: where do moral obligations, ought and ought not to do, come from? According to Christine Korsgaard, a contemporary American philosopher, the source of moral obligations is the human moral identity and its humanity. Because of his self-consciousness, a human being does not do something just out of his desire; rather he asks himself whether it is right to act on the basis of his desire. Korsgaard agrees with Kant that humanity is a value in itself and says that our reasons to do something determine our identity and nature. Our identity as human beings impose unconditional obligations to us, whether we are women or men, of this or that ethnic group, of this or that religious or social group, and so on. Therefore, according to Korsgaard, our identity as a human being is the source of our moral norms and obligations. The violation of these obligations amounts to the loss of our identity. Humanity is a significant part of us. It seems that in addition to certain objections to Korsgaard’s moral theory, it is also subject to objections to Kant’s moral theory, such as the objection that humanity and human practical identity cannot always serve as a successful criterion for the recognition of moral actions.

Keywords

References

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