In this paper, focusing on the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers tries to give an account of why it is so difficult to explain. He criticizes some recent works that use reductive explanation within the framework of neuroscience and cognitive science. This being done, he goes on to argue that these methods fail to come to grips with the hard problem. Then, he argues that, in order to attain a solution for the problem, we must move to a new kind of non-reductive explanation. This way, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. Finally he presents his own candidate; a non-reductive theory based on three psychological principles: structural coherence, organizational invariance, and double-aspect view of information.
Akins, K., (1993) What is it like to be boring and myopic? In (B. Dahlbom, ed.) Dennett and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Allport, A., (1988) “What concept of consciousness?” In (A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, eds.) Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baars, B. J., (1988) A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bateson, G., (1972) Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Chandler Publishing.
Block, N, Flanagan, O. & Güzeldere, G, (eds.) 1996, The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical and Scientific Debates, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
ـــــــــ , (1995) “On a confusion about the function of consciousness”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
Chalmers, D. J., (1996) The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University Press.
Churchland, P.M. (1995) The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Clark, A., (1992) Sensory Qualities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crick, F. and Koch, C., (1990) Toward a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275.
Crick, F., (1994) The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. New York: Scribners.
Dennett, D. C., (1991) Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown.
Dretske, F. I., (1995) Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Edelman, G., (1989) The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. New York: Basic Books.
Farah, M. J., (1994) Visual perception and visual awareness after brain damage: A tutorial overview. In (C. Umilta and M. Moscovitch, eds.) Consciousness and Unconscious Information Processing: Attention and Performance 15. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Flohr, H., 1992, Qualia and brain processes. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds.) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Hameroff, S. R., (1994) Quantum coherence in microtubules: A neural basis for emergent consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 1:91-118.
Hardin, C.L., (1992) Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds.) Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Hill, C. S., (1991) Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hodgson, D., (1988) The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Humphrey, N., (1992) A History of the Mind, New York: Simon and Schuster.
Jackendoff, R., (1987) Consciousness and the Computational Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jackson, F. (1982) Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127-36.
Jackson, F., (1994) Finding the mind in the natural world. In (R. Casati, B. Smith, and S. White, eds.) Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Vienna: H\"older-Pichler-Tempsky.
Kirk, R., (1994) Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kripke, S., (1980) Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Levine, J., (1983) Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:354-61.
Lewis, D., (1994) Reduction of mind. In (S. Guttenplan, ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell.
Libet, B., (1993) The neural time factor in conscious and unconscious events. In (G.R. Block and J. Marsh, eds.) Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.
Loar, B., (1990) Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
Lockwood, M., (1989) Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford: Blackwell.
McGinn, C., (1989) Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98:349-66.
Nagel, T., (1974) What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 4:435-50.
Nelkin, N., (1993) What is consciousness? Philosophy of Science 60:419-34.
Newell, A., (1990) ,Unified Theories of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Penrose, R., (1989) The Emperor's New Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ـــــــــ , (1994) Shadows of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosenthal, D.M., (1996) A theory of consciousness. In (N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere, eds.) The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Seager, W.E., (1991) Metaphysics of Consciousness. London: Routledge.
Searle, J.R., (1980) Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:417-57.
Shallice, T., (1972) Dual functions of consciousness. Psychological Review 79:383-93.
Shannon, C.E., (1948) A mathematical theory of communication. Bell Systems Technical Journal 27: 379-423.
Strawson, G., (1994) Mental Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tye, M., (1995) Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Velmans, M., (1991) Is human information-processing conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14:651-69.
Wheeler, J.A., (1990) Information, physics, quantum: The search for links. In (W. Zurek, ed.) Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information. Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley.
Wilkes, K.V., (1988) Yishi, Duh, Um and consciousness. In (A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, eds.) Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
)