Safe Belief: an Examination of Sosa's Version of the Safety Condition for Knowledge

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

Abstract

In this paper, I will explicate Nozick's truth-tracking theory of knowledge and objections raised against it, and I will then deal with Sosa's primary and reformed versions of the subjunctive conditional of safety as a necessary condition of knowledge. I will then consider some objections to Sosa's view, showing that some of these counterexamples work against Sosa's view. However, I have sought to show that some of these objections do not work against a more precise version of this condition. I have also shown that this condition cannot deal with some counterexamples of Nozick's theory.

Keywords

References

1. Adams, F., & Clarke, M. (2005), “Resurrecting the Tracking Theories,” Australian Journal of Philosophy, 83(2), 207-221.
2. Bennett, J. (2003), A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Bernecker, S. (2012), “Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure,” Acta Analytica, 27.
4. Cohen, S. (2004), “Structure and Connection: Comments on Sosa’s Epistemology,” J. Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
5. Comesaña, J. (2005), “Unsafe Knowledge,” Synthese, 146.
6. ــــــــــ, (2006), “A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem”, Philosophical Studies, 129.
7. ــــــــــ, (2007), “Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals,” Philosophy Compass, 2(6).
8. ــــــــــ, (2013), “Safety and Epistemic Frankfurt Cases,” J. Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, Springer.
9. DeRose, K. (1995), “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” The Philosophical Review, 104(1).
10. Greco, J. (2007), “External World Skepticism,” Philosophy Compass, 2(4).
11. Harman, G. (1973), Thought. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
12. Kripke, S. A. (2011), “Nozick on Knowledge”, S. A. Kripke, Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. Kvanvig, J. L. (2004), “Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge,” Philosophical Issues, 14.
14. Lewis, D. (1973), Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
15. Nozick, R. (1981), Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
16. Pritchard, D. (2005), Epistemic Luck. New York: Oxford University Press.
17. ــــــــــ , (2007), “Anti-Luck Epistemology,” Synthese, 158.
18. ــــــــــ , (2009), “Safety-Based Epistemology: Wither Now?” Journal of Philosophical Research, 34.
19. Roush, S. (2006), Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
20. Sosa, E. (1999a), “How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?” Philosophical Topics, 26(1-2).
21. ــــــــــ , (1999b), “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Philosophical Perspectives, 13.
22. ــــــــــ , (2000b), “Replies to Tomberlin, Kornblith, Lehrer,” Philosophical Issues, 10.
23. ــــــــــ , (2002), “Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge,” P. K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
24. ــــــــــ , (2004), “Replies,” J. Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
25. ــــــــــ , (2007), Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge: A Virtue Epistemology, Vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
26. ــــــــــ , (2009), Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge: Reflective Knowledge, Vol. II. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
27. Vahid, H. (2009), The Epistemology of Belie, Palgrave Macmillan.
28. Vogel, J. (1987), “Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge,” S. Luper-Foy (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge, Totowa: Rowman and Littlefied.
29. Williamson, T. (2000), Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics