Moral phenomenology is the only discipline that can study the experiential or qualitative aspects of the realm of values and is not, like moral psychology, limited to the functional aspects of the values. Phenomenology or phenomenal experience has different meanings and what we have in mind here is the undergoing of a mental state from the first-person perspective, but there is controversy among philosophers as to what mental states can be phenomenally experienced; some require the phenomenal character and some do not; some of those who require the phenomenal character restrict it to the perceptual experiences and some generalize it to the non-perceptual too. In this paper, I will deal with the possibility of moral phenomenology on the basis of these views, and then deal with the problem of commonality and distinction. Finally two objections to the possibility of moral phenomenology will be examined.
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