Searle and the Problem of Consciousness

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

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Abstract

Consciousness is one of the major challenges that philosophy and even contemporary sciences encounter. John Searle holds that the solution to the problem of consciousness is not so hard-it might be solved if we have precise knowledge of the brain and its states. Searle calls this solution "biological naturalism" which amounts to the claim that the brain the cause of consciousness. He does not want to eliminate consciousness at all, though he claims that there is a close link between brain states and mental states. He makes a distinction between two sorts of reduction (ontological and causal) and seeks to consider consciousness in terms of causal reduction, thereby maintaining the independent existence of consciousness. His reliance on empirical sciences and his attempt to avoid dualistic consequences led him to keep consciousness within the realm of the causal relations of the nature, though he accepts the thesis of causal closure. His solution for this problem is the so-called "ontological subjectivity". This allows Searle to make it possible scientifically study subjective entities, just like objective ones.

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References

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