Externalism and the Argument from Gradual Replacement

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Abstract

According to content externalism, the contents of at least some of the intentional states do not supervene upon the internal properties; that is, it is possible to have two duplicate subjects with regard to their internal properties, the contents of whose intentional states are different. So far various arguments have been raised in favor of externalism which have given rise to different versions of this view, including the natural-kind externalism, individual externalism, and social externalism. One of the most important problems regarding externalism is the question of its consistency with the idea of the subject's privileged access to the contents of his own intentional states. The gradual replacement is one of the arguments for the inconsistency between the two ideas. In this paper, I will introduce and examine some of the most significant responses to this argument, and finally I shall propose my own response.

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References

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Naqd Va Nazar
Volume 15, Issue 58 - Serial Number 58
December 2010
Pages 89-133

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