Arguments For and Against Representationalism

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Among arguments for representationalism about the phenomenal character of an experience are argument from seeming and argument from the representational features that exist in phenomenal properties; features such as the truth and accuracy conditions of phenomenal experiences and their intensional context. Representationalism consists of two claims: one that no phenomenal change is possible without a change in the representational content, and the other that no change in the representational content is possible without a phenomenal change. Each of the two claims is subject to counterexamples; cases in which there is a phenomenal change without a representational change or a representational change without a phenomenal change. In this paper, the two arguments for representationalism and its counterexamples will be examined.
 

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