In the second formula of categorical imperative (act so that you treat humanity, whether in yourself or any other person, always, as an end and never as a means only), Kant emphasizes upon the intrinsic equal value of each person which does, in fact, enunciate a fundamental moral, political and religious principle presupposed in the ordinary moral judgments of nearly everyone today. Intrinsic dignity of persons, first, excludes him from thingness and justice in political domain. Persons are "self-existent" ends, having worth simly because they exist. Dignity for persons not only confines the others but also oneself (self-respect & self-regard), and therefor gives rise to duties for others and the self. Dignity for persons imply benevolence (good will) but it is not enough. Sympathy in imagination and empathy in feeling and emotion, and beneficence in practical domain is necessary. In the all , these views are based on the practical reson not moral sense. In this paper I analyse Kant’s view and implications and presuppositions.
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