The Epistemic Role of Emotions in Producing Beliefs: A Review of Elgin’s View

Document Type : Professional

Author

Abstract

According to the standard view, emotions are always obstacles to the proper thinking and in order to think properly we should try our best not to be affected by emotions. Catherine Elgin rejects the generality of this view and believes that in many cases emotions have reliable epistemic products. But it seems firstly that Elgin’s argument for this claim cannot be defended and secondly even if we can give a right interpretation of her view it is not what the standard view rejects. 

Keywords


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