Disagreement and Epistemic Symmetry: Against Equal Weight View

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

Assistant Professor/Shahid Beheshti University-Institute for Science and Technology Studies

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the relation between higher-order evidence and equal weight view in the debate concerning the epistemology of disagreement. First of all, I make a distinction between first-order and higher-order evidence and then present Kelly's argument according to which the effect of higher-order evidence should not necessarily be considered in favor of conciliationists. Then I concentrate on Matheson's argument which claims the opposite. I show that the Matheson's argument is dependent upon a theory of evidence which is called the two-part theory of evidence. After explaining the general problems of such a theory—including the regress problem—I show that this is a highly demanding theory of evidence due to the costs it imposes on the its defenders. Then, by a simple probabilistic modelling, I demonstrate that even accepting the two-part theory of evidence, does not necessarily lead to equal weight view in epistemic disagreement. If my argument works, it cancels out one of the most important arguments in favor of conciliationism

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References

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8. Matheson, Jonathan (2009), “Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” Episteme 6 (3).
Pryor, James (2000), “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist,” Noûs 34 (4).

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