Importance of Meta-Normative Commitments of Value-Free Ideal of Science

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

Institute for Science and Technology Studies, Shahid Beheshti University

Abstract

According to the value-free ideal of science, only epistemic values can have a legitimate role in epistemic assessment of scientific theories. In this paper, I seek to show that the value-free ideal of science is based on a picture of science and its relation with values, that implies certain meta-normative assumptions, which are for several reasons worth noting. Accordingly, after a brief introduction of the main issues of the meta-normative theory, we will discuss the assumptions of the value-free ideal about the relation between science and values. Suggesting an explicit articulation of these assumptions, we show their meta-normative implications. Then a brief sketch of arguments against the value-free ideal follows, which makes clear the neutrality of these arguments with respect to meta-normative positions. Finally, addressing the question whether it is necessary to take into account meta-normative implications of the value-free ideal, it will be noted that recognizing meta-normative commitments of value-free ideal serves a better understanding of the thesis and also opens a new path for putting forward arguments both for and against the value-free ideal of science.

Keywords

References

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