Epistemology Of Disagreement And Higher OrderEvidence

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Author

Assistant Professor, Shahid Beheshti University, Researcher, IPM.

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of higher-order evidence in the debates concerning the epistemology of disagreement. After providing definitions for first-order and higher-order evidence respectively and emphasizing the difference between them, I propose an argument for the view that higher-order evidence can be considered as evidence just in the absence of first-order evidence. Then even through assessing the example concerning the reasoning-distorting drug, I investigate and criticize one of the most important views in the epistemology of disagreement, namely David Christensen's view. In this part, I defend the similarity between the role of higher-order evidence and undercutter evidence and the sameness of their functions in the epistemology of disagreement. Finally, I propose and assess Thomas Kelly's argument for the neutral role of higher-order evidence in the debate. In this part, after defending Kelly's argument from an objection according to which considering the probative force of higher-order evidence leads to Equal Weight View, I will show how Kelly's argument claims to work.

Keywords

References

1. Bergmann Michael (2009), “Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure,” Episteme 6 (3).
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11. Higher-Order Evidence,” Episteme, 6.
12. Pollock, John L. and Cruz, Joseph (1999), Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
 

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