The Naturalistic Fallacy in Moore’s View

Document Type : The Quarterly Jornal

Authors

1 MA Student of Moral Philosophy.

2 Associate Professor, University of Isfahan.

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Moore's view regarding the indefinability of good: is good undefinable? On his view, the concept of good is not derivable of any other concept. Therefore "good" is irreducible to other concepts. According to him, goodness is simple and undefinable. What is meant by definition? Among different definitions, Moore focuses on the most important sense thereof. In addition, Moore considers the "good," as a non- natural quality. He thinks that any effort to identify the good with other natural qualities is a fallacy. It is a naturalistic fallacy as he calls it. He supports his idea by the open question argument. In this paper we will argue that Moore's argument shows at most that the meaning of good and pleasure, for example, are not the same. They are conceptually different but it does not preclude the supposition that they both refer to one and same property.

Keywords

References

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