A deep gap between semantic and ontological features of value-categories has been encouraged by some moral theories, in particular, the ones proposing a monotheistic account of moral values. However, it seems that any successful ontological account of values should be based on our conceptual and semantic intuitions. In this paper, I will propose a semantics for good and bad, on the basis of which I will show that we find some praiseworthiness and admirability in valuable and moral things and this is what has been ignored in a theory like that of necessity in comparison to something else which is proposed as a theory of value and a famous version of which is a monotheistic one. Such a theory would suffer an unwanted consequence: our primary conceptions of the valuability of the moral would not be reliable and our epistemic access to values would be difficult, and for such difficulty, the epistemic and thus the moral deviations
and disputes would be more likely.
لاریجانی، محمدصادق (1379)،جزوۀ دروس خارج اصول (موجود در کتابخانۀ پژوهشگاه علوم و فرهنگ اسلامی).
ــــــــــــ (بیتا)،جزوۀ فلسفۀ اخلاق، قم: مؤسسۀ امام صادق7(موجود در کتابخانۀ پژوهشگاه علوم و فرهنگ اسلامی).
Adams, Robert Merrihew, (1987) “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again,” in The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 128–143 (Reprinted fromThe Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 7, n. 1 (spring 1979), pp. 66–79).
ــــــــــــ (1999),Finite and Infinite Goods; A Framework for Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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