Rigid Designation and Essentialism on Individuals

Document Type : Professional

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Abstract

This article deals with the relation between the theory of semantics of rigid designation of proper nouns in natural language and tat of metaphysical essentialism about individuals. More specifically the auther examines extent to which  Kripke’s arguments   for each of  his essentialist claims depends on the  theory of rigidity of proper nouns. In this way the present article attempts first to explain each one of these theories and then  to distinguish  three different  levels ofessentialism in naming and the necessity, and finally to study the relation of each of essentialist claims with rigidity of proper nouns. Kripke, as it has been shown, is in no case dependent on semantic premisses in arguing for any of his fundamental essentialist claims.

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