عنوان مقاله [English]
According to the value-free ideal of science, only epistemic values can have a legitimate role in epistemic assessment of scientific theories. In this paper, we seek to show that the value-free ideal of science is based on a picture of science and its relation with values, that implies certain meta-normative assumptions, which for several reasons worth noting. Accordingly, after a brief introduction of main issues of meta-normative theory, we will discuss the assumptions of value-free ideal about the relation of science and values. Suggesting an explicit articulation of these assumptions, we show meta-normative implications of accepting them. Then a brief sketch of arguments against the value-free ideal follows, which makes clear the neutrality of these arguments with respect to meta-normative positions. Finally, addressing the question whether it is necessary to take into account meta-normative implications of value-free ideal, it will be noted that recognizing meta-normative commitments of value-free ideal serves a better understanding of the thesis and also opens a new path for putting forward arguments both for and against the value-free ideal of science.