عنوان مقاله [English]
The main question in this paper is the meaning and the nature of moral actions for Ibn Sina. What are the requirements of a moral action that is, for Ibn Sina, the result of observing the middle path between two opposing temperaments? And under what conditions can an action count as a moral middle term? What are the epistemic prerequisites of a moral action? And what are its ontological features? In order to answer these questions, we should first discuss the significance of cultural and ethnical requirements in providing a meaning for an action as a middle term in Ibn Sina’s moral system, and we will then analyze how the action can turn into a habit or a temperament. We then go on to show that the epistemic nature of a moral action is formed for individuals in the society as a matter of reliance on what mystics and the rulings of sharia say. The ontological nature of a moral action will be elucidated in terms of the addition of a certain form to the forms already existing in the world.