جان راولز و روش تعادل اندیشه‌ورزانه در اخلاق

نوع مقاله : علمی ـ پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشیار گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی دانشگاه بین المللی امام خمینی(ره)

چکیده

نلسون گودمن در بحث از معضل قدیمی استقرا به مطلبی اشاره می‌کند که بعدها جان راولز آن را روش تعادل اندیشه‌ورزانه نامید و آن را به منظور استنتاج نظریه عدالت در حوزه فلسفه سیاسی به کار بست. وی مدعی بود در یک جامعه لیبرال، گزینش یک اصل خاص در باب عدالت، مستلزم ترجیحی تحکمی خواهد بود. برای حل این معضل، راولز وضع اولیه‌ای را فرض می‌گیرد که از طریق آن افراد درخصوص اصول هنجاری عدالت به توافق می‌رسند. از نظر او این اصول باید از طریق روش تعادل اندیشه‌ورزانه با احکام اخلاقی ما درباره موارد خاص و جزئی سازگاری یابند. کاربرد مفهوم تعادل اندیشه‌ورزانه در حوزه اخلاق را برخی فیلسوفان و صاحب‌نظران مورد نقدهای جدی قرار داده اند ودر مقابل برخی دیگر از آن دفاع کرده‌اند. به نظر می‌رسد در حوزه اخلاق به‌ویژه اخلاق کاربردی نمی‌توان تنها با توسل به نظریه‌های اخلاقی و نیز اصول اخلاقی انتزاعی به حل مسائل اخلاقی پرداخت. از همین‌رو، به‌رغم مشاجره‌های فراوانی که از حیث نظری درباره این روش وجود دارد، از حیث عملی این روش کاربرد فراوانی در حوزه اخلاق به‌ویژه اخلاق کاربردی دارد؛ به‌گونه‌ای که برخی مدعی شده‌اند این روش تنها روش مفید در حوزه اخلاق است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

John Rawls and the Method of Reflective Equilibrium in Ethics

نویسنده [English]

  • Majid Molla Yousefi
Associate professor, Imam Khomeini International University.
چکیده [English]

In his discussion of the old problem of induction, Nelson Goodman refers to something that was later called the method of reflective equilibrium by John Rawls and was employed by him in order to infer a theory of justice in the domain of political philosophy. He claimed that in a liberal society, the selection of a particular principle regarding justice requires an arbitrary preference. To solve the problem, Rawls considers an initial situation through the developments of which people come to an agreement over the normative principles of justice. For him, these principles should be reconciled with our moral judgments concerning particular cases via the method of reflective equilibrium. The employment of this method came to be criticized by some philosophers and defended by others. It seems that ethical problems, and in particular, problems of applied ethics, cannot be solved only by an appeal to moral theories and abstract moral principles. Thus despite many controversies about this method, it is so useful in the field of ethics, and in particular, applied ethics, that some people have claimed that it is the only useful method in ethics.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Moral Philosophy
  • Reflective Equilibrium
  • Nelson Goodman
  • John Rawls
  • Methodology

مراجع

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